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ABSTRACT 
A key input to inventive activity is human capital. Hence it is important to 
understand the monetary incentives of inventors. We estimate the effect of 
patented inventions on individual earnings by linking data on U.S. patents 
and their inventors to Finnish employer-employee data. Returns are 
heterogeneous: Inventors get a temporary reward of 3% of annual earnings 
for a patent grant and for highly-cited patents a longer-lasting premium of 
30% in earnings three years later. Similar medium-term premia accrue to 
inventors who initially hold the patent rights, although they forego earnings at 
the time of the grant. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A key input to inventive activity is human capital. Thus incentives for individuals to 
invest in acquiring appropriate human capital and to put their effort into inventive 
activities may be important. Therefore it is of substantial interest and significance to shed 
light on the monetary incentives to inventors provided by the labor market. While the 
incentives of firms to invest in innovation have been established in numerous studies on 
the returns to R&D and the value of patents to firms, very little is known of how the 
inventive individuals behind these patents are rewarded for their effort. We take a step 
towards filling this gap by empirically examining the financial returns to patent inventors 
and the heterogeneity of those returns. We construct a dataset where U.S. (USPTO) 
patents and their inventors from the NBER patents and citations data file (Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 2001) are linked to Finnish employee-employer data containing detailed 
information on personal characteristics and earnings as well as information on the 
employers from 1988 to 1999. This data gives us the opportunity to explore, ex-post, the 
existence of monetary incentives for individuals to invent, by estimating the effect of 
patent grants on their earnings.   
 The sources of financial returns to employee-inventors include incentive schemes 
that are directly tied to patenting, as well as indirect effects on earnings through an 
improved position of the individual in the labor market. Compensation schemes that are 
tied to signals of effort and successful outcomes are particularly important when tasks are 
hard-to-monitor, including research- and development activities. A nascent literature 
(Lerner and Wulff 2007 and Lach and Schankerman 2008) exists on the effect of 
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different ex ante incentive schemes on innovative performance. Once granted, a patent 
provides a publicly observable signal about the ability of the inventor and may lead to 
wage increases, for example, through increased outside offers and bargaining.1 We 
therefore expect wages to respond to patenting via direct compensation or labor market 
effects. Taking an ex-post view and measuring the level of rewards provided by the labor 
market and existing incentive schemes is a key input in the design of new ones. Our 
research therefore complements the literature studying the effects of incentives on 
innovation output. 
We have access to a unique dataset of individuals, where we observe individuals’ 
earnings and the USPTO patent grants for their inventions throughout the time period 
from 1991 to 1999 (together with citations received up to 2002). This enables us to take a 
novel and holistic approach to evaluating the existence of monetary incentives of 
invention and estimate the effect of patent grants and patent citations on individuals’ 
earnings. Patents offer a convenient, if not trouble-free, window on individual 
inventiveness and have been exploited in economic research at least since the 1950s 
(Schmookler 1957, Griliches 1990). Using citations to patents improves this measure by 
accounting for patent value (see eg. Trajtenberg, 1990). Monetary rewards to patenting 
may take various forms, including one-time bonuses, value-contingent payments, stock 
options, and wage raises. Thus the returns can be both temporary and long-term, and may 
be realized some time after the patent grant. Therefore, we adopt a flexible specification 
including up to six lags of granted patents to allow us to identify the timing of the returns. 
Given what is known about the heterogeneity in the value of patents, and about the time it 
                                                 
1
 To the extent that such revelation of information leads to better employee-employer/task matches, those 
returns are also partly social returns. 
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takes to learn this value, we expect the signal to become more informative as some time 
passes from the patent grant, and that citations to a patent (shown to be a good indicator 
of patent value) are a more informative signal than a simple patent count. 
With panel data at the individual level and variation over time in patent grants, we 
can control for unobserved individual heterogeneity with fixed effects, and remove the 
ability bias, which is often a problem in exercises of similar nature, such as in estimating 
the returns to schooling (see e.g. Card 2001). The lag between the time of an invention 
and the patent grant enables us to treat granted patents as predetermined variables. Our 
specification also survives the strict exogeneity test, and the fact that first-differences and 
fixed effects results are very similar lends further confidence that strict exogeneity is 
satisfied. This provides some indication that what we measure is the causal effect of 
patent grants on wages.  
We find that inventors get a temporary reward of about 3% of their gross annual 
earnings in the year of the patent grant, presumably corresponding to a one-time bonus 
for being awarded a patent. In addition, patent grants result in an average of a 4-5% 
premium in annual earnings three to four years after the patent grant, and remaining for at 
least the following two years, possibly representing a permanent wage increase. These 
results are robust to 1) including any number of lags from 4-6; 2) including a firm-level 
measure of invention to control for possible firm-level wage effects that are due to 
invention; 3) controlling for the average wages in the firm or industry; 4) excluding the 
year 1999, which may be affected by the IT boom of the turn of the millennium; and 5) 
including a large control group of non-inventors. 
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We also find that, behind the average effect we identify, there are interesting 
differences in returns, depending on the quality or value of the patent as measured by 
expected lifetime citations. These quality-dependent returns are first realized three years 
after the granting of the patent, coinciding with the time it typically takes to learn the 
value of a patent (Pakes 1986, Lanjouw 1998). Similar to the value of patents to firms, 
and in line with the findings of Harhoff and Hoisl (2007), the returns to inventors seem 
heavily skewed, and linked to citations (see Trajtenberg 1990 and Hall, Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2005). Indeed, it is only the highest quality patents that yield positive returns 
for inventors. When we include categories for patent quality, we find that patents with 
20-30 citations generate a premium of 17.5% in annual earnings in the 6th year and 
patents with over 30 citations generate a premium of over 30% from the 4th year onwards. 
In contrast, patents with less than 20 citations seem to generate no returns. Returns to 
inventors are thus very heterogeneous, and tied to observable signals of the quality of the 
patent. 
It seems natural to think of these rewards to patenting as part of “pay for 
performance”, the increase in which has recently been shown to explain a large part of 
growth in male wage inequality in the U.S. from the 1970s to the 1990s (Lemieux, 
MacLeod, Parent 2008). One can also view patenting and the citations a patent receives 
as observable signals of an employee’s ability or productivity. In models of learning 
about worker ability, e.g. Farber and Gibbons (1996), the job market obtains signals of 
worker ability over time (usually assumed to be unobservable to the econometrician) and 
wages respond to these signals. In our application, these signals, represented by patents 
and their quality, are public information and thus observable also to the researchers. Our 
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results indicate that they do play a large role in determining inventive individuals' 
remuneration. These results are also in line with survey evidence on the incentive 
schemes for inventors in Finnish firms, explaining e.g. the immediate reward due to a 
patent being granted.2 Furthermore, the results indicate compliance with the law on 
employee inventions in Finland, which states that inventors are entitled to compensation 
that depends on the value of the invention. 
Most of the patents in our sample are assigned to corporations, but there is a small 
fraction where rights are unassigned or assigned to individuals, presumably the inventor.3 
We also analyze the dependence of the returns on the ownership of the intellectual 
property by comparing the returns to inventors who initially own the patent to the returns 
to those whose patent is assigned to an organization. Individuals and firms may have 
different capabilities to internalize the revenues from an invention, and the overall private 
returns from an invention may be greater for patents assigned to firms (Grönqvist, 2009). 
On the other hand, individuals whose patents are assigned to firms only receive a share of 
the rents. We find that those inventors who initially own their patents first forego some of 
their earnings, but eventually earn substantially higher rewards than those inventors who 
do not have the intellectual property rights over their invention: The returns to inventors 
                                                 
2
 Pekari (1993) examines employee inventions through case studies and interviews of 16 actively patenting 
companies (6 large, 5 medium, 5 small) in Finland. In 11 of the 16 companies (and in all of the large 
companies), there were explicit rules for rewarding employees for their inventions. In large companies, the 
reward structure typically had three phases: at the time of the notice of invention, a fixed reward of 1000-
2500 FIM (160-420 Euros); at the time of the patent grant, a fixed reward of 2200-10000 FIM (360-1700 
Euros); and as the value of the invention is revealed over time, a special value-contingent reward. The fixed 
fees were designed so, that in most of the cases, they would represent “reasonable compensation” for the 
inventor and no special reward would be paid. However, if the invention later proved to be of exceptional 
value, the inventor would have been entitled to a special reward. This special reward is determined by the 
fraction of the value of the invention that the inventor is entitled to, depending on the employee’s overall 
role. The value-contingent reward was typically paid 2-3 years after the patent grant. In small and medium-
sized companies, while fixed rewards for invention and patenting were less common than in large firms, 
special value-contingent rewards for all patented inventions were used. 
 
3
 This can be the case when the invention falls outside the activities of the employer. 
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who initially own their patents is of the order of a 15-30% premium in gross earnings in 
the 5th to 6th year after patent grant (in contrast to the 4-5% average premium for those 
who do not). This difference is not explained by higher quality of inventor owned 
patents: The number of citations to inventor-owned patents is on average lower than to 
company-owned patents. This finding suggests that conditional on the quality of the 
patent, owning the intellectual property significantly increases the returns to inventors.  
A number of other findings are also of potential interest. We find that employer 
changes after the patent grant do not affect the returns, i.e. regardless of whether the 
inventor stays with the firm where the invention is made or changes employers, the same 
returns accrue. Looking at gender differences, we find a male-female wage gap of 20%, 
even conditional on being an inventor. Regarding the difference in returns for males and 
females, we find the same immediate reward, but no long term returns for females. This 
could, of course, be due to a number of factors, e.g., females working in different 
industries and different firms, and we find evidence of heterogeneity between firms. We 
find that there are no significant long term returns in the pharmaceutical sector, and some 
evidence that only the most active patenting firms pay a premium for past patents. We 
also find that inventors have particularly high returns to age (experience), of the order of 
10-12%, possibly mirroring the results of Møen (2005), but the returns to tenure are low 
(less than 1%). 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature. In Section 3 we 
describe the data. In Section 4 we present the empirical framework and in Section 5 the 
results. We conclude in Section 6. 
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2 Literature review 
 
There is evidence that inventors are driven by profit motives. In the 19th century, 
individual inventors reaped the benefits of their inventions through own 
commercialization and through licensing (Khan and Sokoloff, 1993). As inventions 
became more technical and capital-intensive, inventive activity (and individuals) moved 
into larger organizations (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2005). Today, inventors mostly 
invent as a part of their job and inventive activity is to a large extent organized in R&D 
laboratories in firms and other R&D performing organizations. Thus, for today’s 
employee-inventors, the financial incentives to invent are provided through employer 
compensation and through the labor market.  
Incentives to invent are not limited to financial gains, but can also be non-
pecuniary. Rossman (1931) reports the survey responses of a group of over seven 
hundred inventors, including the most prominent inventors of the time, who were asked 
for their motives and incentives to invent. The most commonly cited reason was “love of 
inventing”, followed by “the desire to improve existing devices”. “Financial gain”, 
although clearly important, was only the third most frequently mentioned motive. There 
is clearly an element of current satisfaction (“on-the-job-consumption”) that research 
activity provides in addition to any financial rewards, as also noted by Levin and Stephan 
(1991), and emphasized in biographies of past inventors (Rossman 1931). Similar 
evidence is provided by Stern (2004), who finds that scientists employed by firms in fact 
“pay to be scientists”, i.e., accept lower earnings in return for being able to pursue 
individual research agendas and publish in scientific journals. 
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The importance of non-pecuniary incentives not-withstanding, economists have 
studied the role of monetary incentives in the innovative process. Aghion and Tirole’s 
(1994) incomplete contracts - analysis, for example, normalizes the non-monetary 
incentives to a constant, and studies the effects of monetary incentives. The standard 
theoretical foundation for providing employees with (monetary) incentives comes from 
principal-agent models. These models suggest that compensation should be tied to an 
informative signal of the level of effort (Holmström, 1979). While incentive schemes 
have been subject to empirical research (e.g. Bandiera, Rasul and Barankay 2005, and 
Lazear 2000), they have been less studied in the context of innovation. An important 
exception is Lerner and Wulf (2007), who analyze how corporate R&D managers’ 
compensation affects innovation in firms. Their key finding is that when the corporate 
R&D head has substantial firm-wide authority over R&D decisions, long-term incentives 
such as stock options are associated with a higher level of innovation (more heavily cited 
patents, patents of greater generality and more frequent awards). Another important 
exception is Lach and Schankerman (2008) who study the effect of university royalty 
sharing schemes on university patenting in order to understand the importance of 
monetary incentives for university inventors. They find a positive correlation between the 
royalty share granted to faculty scientists (inventors), and university patenting. These 
papers differ from ours in that they use direct measures of monetary incentives where we 
use outcomes, and in that they use aggregate (firm or university level) data where we use 
individual level panel data. These authors study the effects of incentive schemes on 
inventors’ performance, whereas we seek to measure the aggregate level of all incentive 
schemes - thus our work complements theirs. 
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The provision of incentives is not the only reason why the labor market would 
reward inventors. For example, being a patent inventor may work as a signal of the 
individual’s ability and productivity and so result in a wage premium. Furthermore, such 
signaling can lead to improved firm-worker matches, thus raising earnings. Additionally, 
an invention represents knowledge, some of which is tacit and embedded in the 
individual, and this knowledge should earn a return in the labor market. A related point 
concerns knowledge spillovers: If firms want to prevent such spillovers, they may have to 
pay a wage premium to inventors in order to retain them. Evidence for this is provided by 
Møen (2005), who finds that while the technical staff in R&D-intensive firms first pays 
for the knowledge they accumulate on the job through lower earnings in the beginning of 
their career, they later earn a return on these implicit investments through higher 
earnings. At the same time, in order to benefit from incoming spillovers4, firms are 
willing to pay a premium in order to acquire such workers, as shown by Andersson et al. 
(2006), who find that firms with high potential payoffs from innovation pay more in 
starting salaries than other firms in order to attract star workers (workers with a history of 
higher earnings and wage growth), and furthermore, that such firms also reward these 
workers for loyalty. Van Reenen (1996) finds that technological innovation leads to 
higher average earnings in innovating firms, and interprets the result in accordance with 
theories of rent-sharing.  
Finally, as in many other countries, there is a legal framework that provides a 
basis to expect inventors to earn a return on the inventions they produce while employed 
                                                 
4
 Kaiser et al. (2009) provide evidence that firms hiring mobile R&D workers from patenting firms can 
benefit from incoming knowledge spillovers. They show that such workers contribute to an increase in 
patenting in the recipient firm and also that labor mobility of R&D workers increases the joint patenting 
activity of the firms involved. 
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(the law on employee inventions in Finland, 29.12.1967/656). While giving the right to 
the invention to the employer (in most cases)5, the law also rules that the employee has 
the right to reasonable compensation from the employer for the invention, taking into 
account the value of the invention. Similar legal provisions exist e.g. in Germany, and 
have been studied recently by Harhoff and Hoisl (2007). They address a question that is 
closely related to ours: Using survey data on German inventors of EPO patents, they 
study how the characteristics of the surveyed patent affect the share of the inventor’s 
salary received as compensation for that patent.6 The survey responses from the inventors 
indicate that the average compensation for one patent is 1.8 percent of annual gross 
income, and for all patents an average of 8.3%.  
3 Data 
3.1 Matching USPTO and FLEED data 
Our source of information on inventions and inventors is the NBER patents and citations 
data file (Hall, Jaffe Trajtenberg, 2001) on U.S. Patent Office (USPTO) patents. In the 
past few years, there have been some research projects making use of large scale 
inventors’ data. Most notably, Trajtenberg et al. (2006) have developed a computerized 
                                                 
5
 Finnish law divides inventions into four groups in this respect: inventions in group A either came about as 
through a close relation with the job of the inventor, and utilization of the invention fits into the activities of 
the employer or came about as part of the job of the inventor (no matter whether the utilization fits into the 
activities of the employer or not). In this case, the employer owns the invention if it so chooses. Inventions 
in group B came about in a different relation to the job as those in group A, but fit into the activities of the 
employer. For these inventions, the employer has user rights, but must negotiate over any larger rights. 
Inventions in group C came about without a connection to the job of the inventor, but the utilization falls 
into the activities of the employer. The employer has then the right to negotiate over use rights first. 
Inventions in group D came about without a connection to the job of the inventor and the utilization does 
not fall into the activities of the employer. The employer has no rights in this case (Mansala 2008). 
6
 Their survey contains a question about this share, but apparently no questions on levels of monetary 
compensation. Harhoff and Hoisl also offer a very nice discussion of legal compensation schemes for 
inventors in various countries. 
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matching procedure to identify inventors in the NBER patent data. Some studies have 
used smaller scale data: Kim, Lee and Marschke (2004) use matched firm-inventor data 
from the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries to study the relationship between 
firm size and inventor productivity. We go a step further than the previous studies and 
match inventor data to the employee records in a longitudinal employer-employee dataset 
of the Finnish working-aged population (FLEED) that resides at Statistics Finland. The 
FLEED is a register-based dataset that contains detailed information on all Finnish 
individuals in the working age population and their characteristics, in particular their 
annual earnings, as well as firm-level information on their employers.7  
The NBER patent data contains the names of all inventors of a given patent, and 
information on their address (at a minimum, the municipality of residence). In Finland, 
each resident is given a unique identifier (the personal identity code), which is contained 
in the Finnish Population Information System (FPIS) together with basic personal 
information, including the address and municipality of residence. With the aid of the 
Population Information System, inventor information from the NBER patent data can be 
linked to their personal identity codes. These personal identity codes are also contained in 
the FLEED (in encrypted form), enabling the linking of inventor information with it.8 
Those Finnish patents from the NBER data that are assigned to Finnish companies have 
also been linked to their assignee firms in the FLEED. This provides us with an 
additional link we can use to help us identify the inventors. In cases where the name and 
residence information in the inventor data matches more than one personal identity code 
                                                 
7
 Given the richness of the FLEED data it is impossible to detail its contents here. See Korkeamäki and 
Kyyrä (2000) for a description of the FLEED. 
8
 The process of linking the inventor records to personal identification codes was done at the Statistics 
Finland by their own personnel under strict confidentiality, and we never had access to any information that 
would have enabled the identification of individual people from the data. 
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from the FPIS, we also utilize this link between the patent inventor and the patent 
assignee, allowing us to search for the correct personal identity code from among the 
employees of the assignee firm. Altogether, this information helps us in solving a key 
issue that has hampered progress in studying inventors: The matching of inventors from 
patent documents to other data. 
 We use USPTO patents rather than Finnish patents, because they should be more 
valuable. Grönqvist (2009) has estimated that the average value of a Finnish patent is of 
the order of only 5000€, reflecting the small size of the Finnish market. Using USPTO 
data will also make our results comparable to other studies using the same data.  
The data construction proceeded as follows. Using the full name and the 
municipality of residence on the inventor record (as well as the full address where 
available), together with the patent application year, the FPIS was searched for matching 
records and all matching personal identity numbers were linked to the inventor record. 
For some, this resulted in a unique match, while for others a number of potential identity 
numbers matched the inventor information. In order to determine the right identity for the 
inventor, we utilized the link between the patent inventor and the assignee firm to search 
the personal identity codes of all the employees in the assignee for matches with those 
linked to the inventor record. 
For those individuals for whom more than one personal identity number was 
found from the population register, the identification of the correct individual was based 
on the assumption that they are employees of the patent assignee firm. While we expect 
this to hold true for the majority, in some cases this may lead to misidentification of the 
inventor. Thus we may have assigned a patent to some non-inventors, and at the same 
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time failed to assign the patent to its proper inventor. If this is the case, it introduces some 
measurement error into our patent variable and biases our estimates downward. 
Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, we were unable to identify and link all the 
patent-inventor records to the employee records, for two reasons. First, for some inventor 
records, the search from the population register produced no match. This could be due to 
misspellings in the names or incorrect information for some other reason. Second, for 
some of those inventor records for which several matching identity numbers were 
obtained from the population register, more than one of these identity numbers were also 
found among the employees of the patent assignee firm. Without a unique match, we 
failed to identify and link the patent to any individual, so that these inventors are not 
included in our sample.  
Taking from the NBER patents data all the patents whose country code is FI, and 
which were applied for between 1988 and 1999, and linking these patents to their 
inventors, whose country code is FI, we end up with 8065 inventor-patent records. From 
these, we manage to identify and link 5905 records to the FLEED, consisting of 3253 
individuals. For our empirical analysis, we limit the sample to observations from the year 
1991 onwards, because the linking of inventors and patents to the FLEED is based on the 
application year of the patent, but our analysis uses the grant year of the patent. The 
typical lag from the patent application to the grant is between one and three years, so for 
most of the cases, we are able to match a patent inventor to a granted patent from 1991 
onwards. The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel, with 91% of the individuals 
appearing in the data for all the nine years, resulting in a total of 28212 observations.  
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3.2 Samples and descriptive statistics 
The process described above generates our data on inventors, i.e., individuals that are 
listed as inventors in at least one USPTO patent during our observation period.9 We limit 
our estimation sample to individuals who are full-time employees at the end of the years 
in which we measure their earnings (i.e. remove those classified as entrepreneurs, 
unemployed, students, retired, in military service or otherwise out of the labor market). 
Removing from the sample observations for which there are missing values in any of the 
variables we need, we are left with a sample of 15996 observations on 2156 individuals. 
For our full specification, which includes six lags of the patent variable, the sample 
consists of about 4938 observations on 1789 individuals.  
Table 1a presents some descriptive statistics for this sample for the years 1991, 
and 1995-1999. We see that the individuals in this sample are predominantly male (92%), 
on average 39 years old in 1991 (45 years old in 1999), and employed by their current 
employer (tenure) for 8 years on average in 1991. The mean annual earnings in the 
sample is about 37 000 Euros (median 34 400) in 1991 and they increase throughout the 
time period, reaching over 50 000 Euros (median 44 900) in 1998 (all converted to 1999 
money). The mean earnings in 1999 are at 80 000 Euros with a very high variance 
(median 44 900). Table 1b presents the descriptive statistics conditional on having been 
granted a patent that year: The number of individual inventors has almost tripled over the 
period of the 1990’s from 196 to 560; the mean number of patents per inventor ranges 
from 1.2 to 1.4. The patent quality, i.e. the mean number of expected lifetime citations 
                                                 
9
 Some 11% of the individuals listed as inventors are in a managerial position and could e.g. be managers 
of a laboratory. It could be that they have their names on the patent as a matter of policy rather than through 
having been involved hands-on in the inventive process. Our view on this is that, to the extent that the 
laboratory manager is responsible for creating an environment that is conducive towards invention, they 
should be rewarded and we want to include them into our sample as inventors. 
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(see section 5.4 for an explanation) received per patent, varies around 13 and shows no 
particular trend. Table 1c presents the levels and fields of education for the sample. The 
inventors are fairly highly educated, with more than half of the inventors having a 
masters degree or a doctorate. Most of the inventors have an engineering degree (78%). 
Table 1d shows the number of observations in the main industry sectors represented in 
the sample, with 70% of the individuals working in the following 5 sectors: 
Manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products; machinery and equipment; radio, tv 
and communication; medical, precision, and optical instruments; and provision of 
business services.  
The number of firms represented in the data is 224 in 1991 and 528 in 1999, with 
a total of 936 different firms over the whole time period. The distribution of the number 
of individuals per firm is skewed, with (in 1999) over 350 firms employing just one 
inventor, 60 firms employing two inventors, 30 firms with 3 inventors, and only three 
firms with more than 100 inventors.  
[Tables 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d here] 
 In Figure 1 we present the histogram of the number of patents per inventor over 
our sample period. The great majority of them (60%) have just one patent over the whole 
time period, while about 20% have two patents and the most inventive of them as many 
as 23 patents. To gain further insight into this, Figure 2 presents a histogram displaying 
the frequency of observations with n patents. This distribution is also heavily skewed 
with a mass at zero patents: Almost 12993 observations with zero patents in a given year 
(not shown in the figure), 2422 observations with one patent, and 409 with two patents. 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of citations for observations with at least one patent. This 
distribution is also heavily skewed to the left with a long right tail. 
[Figures 1 - 3 here] 
 We have 127 inventor-patent grant observations where the patent is owned by the 
inventor(s) at the time of granting the patent, while the rest are observations where the 
patent is assigned to an organization (mostly companies, so we refer to these as 
corporate-owned patents). Comparing the number of citations by ownership we find that 
inventor-owned patents receive fewer citations than those owned by organizations: The 
mean number of citations for inventor-owned patents is 7.32 and that for corporate-
owned patents 10.27. 
4 The empirical framework 
We estimate equations of the following form: 
itti
j
jtijitit patentXw εµαγβ
τ
++++= ∑
=
−+
0
)(1)ln( ,     (1) 
where ln(wit) refers to the log of annual wage income, Xit is a vector of person- and firm-
level characteristics, iα  is an individual-specific unobservable fixed effect, possibly 
correlated with the variable patent, tµ  is a year dummy, and itε  is the error term. 
Personal characteristics include the person’s age and its square, a vector of 42 dummy 
variables for the level and field of education, gender, tenure with the current employer, 
and the number of months employed during the year. Firm characteristics include the 
 17
sector of the firm, the number of employees in the firm, and its location regionally 
(NUTS2: 5 location dummies10).  
The variable patentit is a variable capturing the individual i’s inventions in period 
t. The simplest measure of invention we use is a patent count, i.e., the number of patents 
granted in a given year in which the individual is listed as an inventor. Because 
inventions can affect earnings in subsequent years, not just in the year of the patent grant, 
we include τ lags of the patent variable in order to estimate any long-term wage effects of 
innovation. We experiment with as many lags as the data enables.  
We also explore the implications of patent value or quality on the inventors’ 
earnings by using forward citations to the patent. A number of studies have shown that 
there is substantial heterogeneity in the value of innovations, and that this distribution is 
highly skewed, e.g. by using patent counts and renewal decisions (Pakes 1986, Lanjouw 
1998, Grönqvist 2007), survey questions on patent value (Harhoff, Narin, Scherer and 
Vopel, 1999), and from patent citations (Trajtenberg 1990, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
2005). Given that the returns to firms from patents are highly variable, one might expect 
that the rewards that employers pay to inventors are also based on the value of the 
innovation.  
We use both the within and first-differencing transformation to identify the effect 
of patenting on an individual’s wage. The key aspect is that any unobservable individual 
time invariant factors are removed by these transformations. Importantly, this relieves us 
of the ability bias typically encountered in the returns to schooling studies (see Card 2001 
for a review of the schooling studies). Both the within and first-differenced estimators are 
                                                 
10
 The NUTS 2 is a five-level regional classification system of the European Union. In Finland the five 
major regions are: Southern Finland, Western Finland, Eastern Finland, Northern Finland, and Åland. 
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consistent under the assumption of strict exogeneity: [ ] 0,,...,| 1 =iiTiit ZZE αε .11 We 
expect no contemporaneous correlation between the error term and the patenting variable, 
because a patent granted in year t has in effect been (pre)determined before year t. The 
lag between the years of patent application and granting of the patent is on average 2 
years in our data. Therefore the effort into developing the innovation has been put in at 
least a couple, probably more, years before the granting of the patent. One possible worry 
about the strict exogeneity condition is that future wage shocks may be correlated with 
the current period value of the patent variable, for example through labor markets treating 
patenting as a signal of (permanent or at least long-lasting) productivity. However, this is 
part of the effect we estimate and is captured by the inclusion of the lagged values of the 
patent variable. If, on the other hand, the realization of patents in the future is correlated 
with the contemporaneous error term in the wage equation, the strict exogeneity 
condition would be violated. This could happen, for example, through changes in jobs 
either within or between firms, if a job change results in a better match between inventor 
and firm and also improves the patent productivity of the inventor. We apply a test of 
strict exogeneity and do not reject it. Under this assumption, the individual fixed effects 
also take care of selection into the sample and thus make the use of a control sample of 
non-inventing individuals unnecessary. As one of our robustness tests, we include a large 
control group of non-inventors into our estimation sample: Our results are robust to this. 
                                                 
11
 First-differencing does not necessitate strict exogeneity. For a discussion, see e.g. Wooldridge (2002) ch. 
10.6. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Base specification 
In Table 2 we present the results from estimating our base specification with the variable 
patent being the number of patents granted to individual i in year t. While our preferred 
estimation methods are fixed effects and first-differencing, we also report the results from 
pooled OLS for comparison. The pooled OLS estimate of the returns to inventors is 
0.035, the fixed effects estimate is 0.016, and the first-difference estimate is 0.013. The 
magnitude of the OLS estimate reflects the upward bias generated from unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, as expected. These results indicate that the average increase in 
earnings due to having an invention being granted a patent is around 1.5%.  
[Table 2 here] 
Some of the control variable coefficients are of interest: The age premium (the 
return to experience) is relatively high (coefficient on age circa 0.1 and that of squared 
age -0.001) compared to the coefficient on tenure12 (measured in years), which is only 
0.002 – 0.009. The coefficient on the female dummy is -0.21 (OLS coefficient). Firm size 
has a positive effect on earnings (large firms pay higher earnings). Most of the year 
dummy-coefficients are significant, as are many of the education and sector indicators’ 
coefficients. 
In order to test whether inventors are rewarded already at the time of the patent 
application, we ran a specification where we also include the number of patent 
                                                 
12
 We also tried specifications including the square of tenure, which was mostly insignificant and did not 
affect our results. 
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applications together with patent grants in year t.13 We find no significant effect of patent 
applications on earnings; the coefficient on the patent grants remains the same.  
5.2 Including lags 
We next investigate whether the effect of patenting on wage is a permanent increase in 
the wage level (e.g. a wage raise) or a temporary one (e.g. a bonus) by including lags of 
the patent variable. Including lags is also important because patent grants may be 
correlated over time and thus introduce an omitted variable bias when not included in the 
estimations (in other words, violation of the strict exogeneity). 
We run a series of regressions where we include lagged values of the patent 
variable, experimenting with one to six lags. We also test the strict exogeneity 
assumption by including the lead of the patent variable in our fixed effect model, and by 
including the levels of the patent variables in our first-differenced model (see e.g. 
Wooldridge 2002, ch. 10.7.1). We cannot reject the null in either case. In Table 3 we 
present the results from the estimations with six lags.14 The coefficients of the control 
variables (age, tenure, gender) hardly change. In all the estimations, the coefficient of the 
current value of patent remains positive, and in fact goes up (0.050 in OLS, 0.022 in FE, 
and 0.028 in FD). This suggests that there indeed is an omitted variable bias in the base 
specification results.15 In addition, the fourth, fifth and sixth lags get a positive significant 
                                                 
13
 For these regressions, we are forced to exclude the most recent years of our data (1997-1999), because 
we do not observe the patent applications for patents granted after 1999. 
14
 Results from specifications including up to 4 and 5 lags produce similar results. Specifications with less 
than 4 lags miss the positive effect captured by the 4th – 6th lags. Including a 7th lag reduces the 
significance of the estimates below 10%, although the signs are the same and magnitudes are close to those 
with fewer lags. This may be due to the fact that using 7 lags only leaves two years of data at our disposal. 
15
 Intuitively, what happens in the base specification is that the (fourth – sixth) years after the patent grant 
are wrongly allocated into the control group of “no patent grant” – years, raising the average wage earned 
while in the control group, and thereby inducing a downward bias in the base specification patent 
coefficient. 
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coefficient in the fixed effects and first differenced regressions, ranging from 0.04-0.05. 
These results indicate that, first of all, there is a temporary wage increase in the year of 
being granted a patent in the order of just below 3%, and in addition to that, there appears 
to be a longer lasting, possibly permanent, effect increasing earnings from 4 to 5 percent 
four years after the invention is patented.16 The fact that this wage increase comes a few 
years after the patent grant may be related to the fact that it typically takes three to four 
years to learn the value of the patent (see Pakes 1986 and Lanjouw 1998 for German, UK 
and French patents and Grönqvist 2007 for Finnish patents). For example, Pakes (1986) 
finds that only 1.2 (0.5)% of French patent owners learn that their patent has no value in 
the 3rd (4th) year of patent life, and that the probability of learning a better use of the 
patent is only 0.1 (0.0)% in the 3rd (4th) year of patent life. His respective numbers for 
German patents are even lower.  
[Table 3 here] 
5.3 Non-linear effects 
Next, we investigate whether the returns to inventors depend on the number of patented 
inventions in a non-linear way, keeping in mind that in most cases our patent count 
variable takes on the values 0 or 1, with less than 4% of observations having a value of 
more than 1. Here we report the results from the fixed effects estimations.  
First, we include the square and cube of the patent count in addition to the linear 
effect. In the specification without lags, the coefficient (standard error in parentheses) on 
the patent count is -0.027 (0.016), on the square term 0.023 (0.011), and on the cubic 
                                                 
16
 It seems very unlikely that the patent lags would capture nonlinear experience or tenure effects as our 
specification includes a quadratic function of age, and tenure. In addition, we have estimated a specification 
with squared tenure included, with identical results. 
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term -0.0017 (0.0013), indicating that there are no immediate returns for one patent grant, 
returns of 2.5% for two patents, 8% for three patents, and 15% for four patents. When we 
include the lags, and square and cubic terms of the lagged variables, the coefficients are 
no longer significant on these variables.  
We also test for non-linear effects by including the number of patents granted in a 
given year as a categorical variable. While many of the estimated coefficients are not 
significant due to the small number of positive values in these categories, the results 
show that the effects of having 5 or more patent grants are particularly large (although 
significant, they are imprecisely estimated), corresponding to wage differentials of 35%-
80% relative to having no granted patents. The coefficient on two patent grants is 0.037 
(0.024) and on three it is 0.074 (0.049). In the specification with lagged values, the results 
that emerge as significant are the coefficients on the contemporaneous terms for five 
patents: 0.21 (0.12) and six patents: 0.86 (0.40), on the 4th-6th lags of the term for two 
patents (coefficients of 0.09 to 0.18), as well as the 5th and 6th lags of the term for one 
patent (0.07 and 0.04). While the results from these estimations testing for non-linear 
effects are plagued by the limited amount of variation for patent categories above two, 
they seem to indicate that there are particularly high returns for those inventors who get a 
large number of patents.  
 
5.4 Accounting for the quality of the patent 
The effect on earnings of having made a patented invention is likely to depend on the 
value of the patent. The number of citations received by a patent has been shown to be a 
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fairly good proxy for the value of the patent,17 so we run the regressions including lags of 
the number of citations received by the inventor’s patents together with the current period 
patent count. Using citations suffers from the problem of truncation, as citations to a 
patent arrive over long periods of time, but we only observe them until the last year of the 
available data.18 We adjust these citation counts using the results in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001) to remove the effects of truncation. These adjustments provide us 
with an estimate of the total number of citations a given patent will receive in its lifetime. 
We acknowledge that these estimates will be somewhat noisy, because for the patents in 
our data we only observe citations for the subsequent 3-15 years. Typically, the prime 
citation years for a patent are roughly 3-10 years after the grant (Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2005). The less citation years we observe for a patent, the noisier these 
estimates are.  
The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4. We find that between 
three and six years after the patent grant (and possibly permanently), the number of 
citations received has a positive effect on the inventor’s earnings, with every 10 citations 
received increasing the inventor’s wage by around 3-5% (the estimates from the FD 
estimation are slightly lower than from the FE, and only weakly significant). These 
results lend support to the notion that the returns to inventors depend on the value of the 
patent, and are realized three years after the patent grant once the value of the invention is 
learned. The immediate effect of the patent grant remains. Similar to the value of patents 
to firms, and in line with the findings of Harhoff and Hoisl (2007), the returns to 
                                                 
17
 For example, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) find that both the patents to R&D and the citations to 
patents ratios significantly impact the market value of the patenting firm. 
18
 Here we make use of the updates to the NBER patent data, available from Bronwyn H. Hall’s website, 
allowing us to observe the number of citations received by the patents up until 2002. 
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inventors thus seem heavily skewed. These findings lend further support for the claim, 
originating from Trajtenberg (1990), that citations are a measure of patent value.19 
[Table 4 here] 
To study the link between patent quality and returns further, we categorized patents 
according to the number of citations they receive. These results, displayed in Table 5, 
offer evidence that returns to inventors are highly tied to patent quality: We find that 
patents in the two highest quality categories (21 – 30 and over 30 citations) receive high 
positive returns. Those in the category of 21-30 citations obtain returns of 17.5% in the 
6th year. Those in the highest category start earning returns in the 3rd year after patenting 
(23%) that are increasing in time and reach 36% in the 6th year. Our point estimates 
indicate that inventors with patents that obtain no citations earn a negative premium 
throughout. Two of these (for the 2nd and 4th years) are significant.  
These results are qualitatively in line with models that suggest that the job market 
learns an employer’s ability over time and rewards it. While such learning is often (e.g. 
Farber and Gibbons 1996) modeled as unobservable to the econometrician, one could 
view patenting and citations as observable measures of learning, available to the job 
market, public as they are. 
[Table 5here] 
5.5 Reward mechanisms 
To extend our analysis from the level of returns to inventors to the sources of returns, we 
do three things: First, we study whether it is changes of employer that yield the estimated 
                                                 
19
 Trajtenberg (1990) found that citations reflect the social value of inventions. We find that they reflect the 
private (inventor) value of inventions.  
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returns. As patents are public information, the granting of a patent may make the 
inventors “more visible” and/or more valuable to other employees and returns to 
inventors could then be realized through job changes. Second, patents are not just a 
measure of invention: They also dictate who has the intellectual property over a given 
invention at the time of the patent grant, and (not) owning the intellectual property may 
affect the return to inventors, keeping the value of the patent constant. These returns may 
be realized through a variety of mechanisms such as licensing fees or through the sale of 
the intellectual property rights, or simply by increasing the value of the individual in the 
job market. We therefore study the effect of (not) owning the intellectual property at the 
time of the patent grant. Concentrating on ownership of intellectual property at the time 
of patent grant allows us to capture also the returns to inventors generated through 
subsequent sale of the intellectual property rights. Finally, we change our dependent 
variable to include capital income. As discussed in the introduction, if patents are 
valuable to the employer and producing patents requires effort (that is hard to monitor or 
measure), the employer may resort to providing incentives that generate capital income as 
well. It should be noted that since 1995 in Finland, stock options have been taxed as 
income and not as capital gains and thus are included in the dependent variable in our 
earlier regressions.  
 Turning first to the question of returns due to employer changes: The data shows 
that about 4% of the individuals change employers in a given year, and that over the time 
period of six years (from 1993-1999), 22% of the individuals have changed employers at 
least once. To study the possibility that the returns to inventors are generated through 
changes in jobs, we include a series of indicator variables and interactions between them 
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and the patent variables to capture the effect of job changes between the year of the 
patent grant and the year when income is measured. To illustrate, consider an individual 
who obtained one patent three years ago, and changed her job last year. For her, the 
interaction between the job change indicator and the count of patents obtained three years 
ago would take the value one. This interaction allows us to separately identify the returns 
coming from patents obtained three years ago to those individuals who have subsequently 
changed jobs and to those who have not. Adding these variables into the specification 
containing lags of patent counts, we find that neither any of the new indicators, nor any of 
the interactions obtains a significant coefficient. Furthermore, our point estimates for the 
patent count variables are virtually unchanged. While this result suggests that actual job 
changes do not generate any extra returns to inventors, it does not mean that the existence 
of the possibility of changing jobs would not be a causal factor behind the returns we 
estimate.  
 In contrast, we do find that the ownership of intellectual property rights is a 
significant mechanism through which the returns to inventors are generated. We separate 
the patents into two classes: Those owned by a company (whether the employer of the 
inventor(s) or some other) at the time of the patent grant, and those owned by the 
inventor(s). We then re-estimate the model with lags of patent counts for both types of 
patents. The coefficients of the patent variables from both a fixed effects and a first-
difference estimation of this specification are reported in Table 6. From that Table it is 
obvious that the reward structures are different when we condition for ownership: 
Inventors who initially own the patent first forego some of their earnings (possibly due to 
efforts in developing and commercializing the inven
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than those earned by inventors of patents owned by a firm. Patents initially owned by the 
inventor(s) yield negative returns in the year of the patent grant and the year after that 
(inventors forego 7 and 15% of their annual earnings in these years), but later yield 
returns of circa 15% in the 5th year after patent grant (the point estimate in the FE model 
is 20%, but insignificant), and returns of around 30% in the 6th year (the point estimates 
are similar from both FE and FD, but the first-difference estimator is insignificant). The 
coefficients for the patent count variables when the inventor is not the initial owner are 
very close to those we obtained earlier (see Table 3), with returns in years 4-6 after the 
patent grant between 3.5 (6th year in the fixed effects regression) and 5.1% (5th year in the 
fixed effects regression). These differences in returns are not explained by the inventor-
owned patents being of higher quality: As reported above, the number of citations is 
lower for (initially) inventor-owned patents than others.  
 A possible explanation for the initial negative returns to inventors who own their 
patents is that after obtaining a patent, they invest in increasing the value of the patent. 
Such investments could include development of the technology, spending time informing 
potential buyers about the technology and/or organizing the licensing or sale of the 
patent. Such activities could lead to a short-term decrease in earnings. 
[ Table 6 here] 
 Finally, turning to the question of whether inventors are rewarded through capital 
income -generating mechanisms, we re-estimate our model by changing the dependent 
variable to be the logarithm of the sum of wage and capital income (instead of being the 
logarithm of the former only). Estimating the model with lagged patenting variables (and 
a fixed effects estimator) we find that the coefficients of the lags for 4th to 6th year are 
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significant (4th year only at 7% level, others at 1% level) with point estimates of 0.038, 
0.052 and 0.04. These are all slightly lower than those reported in Table 3. Converting 
these per cent returns to monetary rewards we find that the monetary rewards at the wage 
level are almost exactly the same as when including both wage and capital income: Using 
the mean wage and capital income over the years 1997-1999 as our base, the estimated 
monetary returns at the wage level are 2550€ in the 4th year after the patent, 3260€ in the 
5th and 2900€ in the 6th. These compare to monetary returns of 2560€, 3500€ and 2700€ 
when capital income is included in the dependent variable. It thus seems that the job 
market does not reward inventors through capital income. One reason why we find no 
extra returns in capital income is probably that stock options are in fact taxed (and 
reported) as annual wage income. 
5.6 Robustness 
Finally, we perform a couple of estimations to check the robustness of our results and 
examine some alternative explanations for them. We first test whether our results remain 
once we control for firm-level rent-sharing due to patenting, as found by van Reenen 
(1996). We also include the average wage in the firm (and alternatively in the industry 
sector) in which the individual works to control for average earnings growth in firms and 
sectors. We then examine whether the results are solely due to the IT-boom of the late 
1990s, affecting only some of the firms and sectors in the sample. We also check whether 
men and women earn similar returns for their inventions. Finally, we check that our 
results are robust to including a random sample of controls; we append a large random 
sample of individuals who are employed at R&D-performing firms, but who do not 
invent, and perform all of our estimations for this sample. 
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 First, given the result of van Reenen (1996) that innovation in a firm leads to higher 
average wages (interpreted as higher wages for all employees), and given that our goal in 
this paper is to estimate the returns to those individuals who make the inventions, we 
want to remove the possible concern that the returns we estimate are a reflection of firm-
level rent-sharing.20 To accomplish this, we include a variable for the number of patents 
granted to the firm in year t, together with lagged values of it. None of the coefficients on 
the firm patent variable are significant, while all our other results remain as before, thus 
eliminating concerns that it is the firm-level effect that is driving our results. Similarly, 
when we control for firm average wage (and industry average wage), our main results on 
the earnings premiums remain. 
Second, given that the late 1990s (and particularly the year 1999) was a period 
characterized by sharply rising market values in the IT-sector (the IT-boom), it is 
worthwhile to check whether only these years, or these particular sectors, are the ones 
when and where inventors earned returns. In order to allow us to keep our specification 
with all the six lags, we only remove the year 1999 from the sample. Doing so hardly 
affects our results: The coefficients (standard errors) on the 4th, 5th, and 6th lags are: 0.06 
(0.03), 0.04 (0.02) and 0.05 (0.02). We also test whether the returns are different for 
different sectors of the economy; we interact our patent count and its lagged values with 
variables for the main industries in our sample: Machinery, metals, chemicals, IT, and 
medical instruments. The direct effects of the patent counts remain as before, and only a 
few significant differences emerge between the sectors: In particular, the medical 
instruments sector stands out as not providing any medium-term returns to patenting 
                                                 
20
 Although, given that the sample contains individuals from the same firm who get patents that year and 
those who don’t, the results are not likely to be merely the result of firm-level wage effects. 
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(negative significant coefficients on the interactions with the 4th-6th lags of the same 
magnitude as the direct effects). On the other hand, the IT-sector does not stand out as 
being different from the average.  
To check whether the returns we estimate are driven by the few firms that are the 
largest patenting firms in Finland, we also perform our estimations removing from the 
estimating sample the observations from the largest two and largest three patenting firms 
(losing more than one third of observations). We find that none of the patent variables 
remain significant, which, while pointing towards the fact that it is especially these large 
patenting firms that pay returns to inventors, could also be due to the fact that we have 
removed most of the patent variables with positive values and are left with very little 
variation in our data.  
When we allow the returns to be different for women and men (by taking 
interactions of gender with the patent count and its lags), we find that while the “bonus”-
reward is not significantly different for the genders, the estimated long-run returns are 
driven by returns to men, not women. (The interactions for females are negative and 
significant and of the same magnitude as the direct patent count effects). 
Finally, our results are robust to including a random sample of non-inventors from 
the same firms. With a sample of over 70 000 individuals (nearly 200 000 observations), 
all of our qualitative results remain, with the additional result that the coefficient on the 
3rd lag is now significant in all of the estimations. The estimated coefficients go up in all 
specifications: Their magnitudes are 1.3-1.5 times the ones from the estimations on the 
sample of inventors. 
 31
6 Conclusions 
The engine of economic growth is technological progress; the engine of technological 
progress is human inventiveness. We address the question of the returns to individual 
inventors by estimating the effect of obtaining a U.S. patent on the earnings of Finnish 
inventors over subsequent years. We investigate the timing and nature of these returns, 
and their dependence on the quality of the invention and on the ownership of IPRs. 
 Our results indicate that, there is a close to 3% temporary increase in earnings in 
the year the patent is granted, probably representing a one-time bonus, and a 4-5% 
increase in earnings three to four years after the patent grant, which remains there for at 
least the following two years, and possibly represents a permanent wage increase. We 
also find that the returns to being a patent inventor depend strongly on the quality or 
value of the patent as measured by the expected lifetime citations received by a patent. 
Highest-quality patents generate high returns to inventors while low-quality patents 
generate no or even negative returns. These quality-dependent returns are first realized 
three years after the granting of the patent, coinciding with the time it typically takes to 
learn the value of a patent. We also find that the returns to inventors depend not only on 
the quality of the invention, but also on ownership of intellectual property: Having 
ownership of the intellectual property when the patent is granted first yields negative 
returns but later increases the estimated returns in years 5-6 after the patent grant 4-6 
fold, from around 4% to between 15 and 30%. This result is not explained by quality 
differences between inventor-owned and other patents.  
Our results can thus be summarized in the following three points: First, returns to 
inventors are very heterogeneous, with low-quality patents yielding no, and high-quality 
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patents yielding high returns; second, that while a patent grant is accompanied by a small 
bonus reward, the main part of the returns accrue to the inventors only after the quality of 
the patent is revealed; and third, that it is not only the act of invention that yields returns, 
but also the ownership of the intellectual property, as the returns to those inventors who 
own their patents are much higher than the returns to inventors whose employer has the 
rights on the intellectual property.  
The results are consistent with the possible explanations presented in the 
introduction. One, firms’ optimal design of incentive compensation schemes may be such 
that it gives rewards for observed signals of effort, and patent grants and the revealed 
quality of the patent in later years work as such signals. Two, patents and in particular 
their later-revealed quality may work as important signals of individual ability, and part 
of the later wage premium may be a result of the labor market effect of public learning of 
individuals' ability and productivity. Three, the results are in line with the law on 
employee inventions in Finland. 
 The results indicate that incentive mechanisms for inventors in Finland are such 
that they promote invention and direct effort towards high-valued inventions. As Finland 
is one of the countries that has improved its rate of invention, measured by U.S. patents, 
the most over the last decades (Trajtenberg 2001), understanding the role of monetary 
incentives in bringing this change about may offer lessons of more general applicability.  
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Figure 1. Total number of patents in 1991-1999 per inventor  
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Figure 2. Number of patents per observation  
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
Fr
e
qu
en
cy
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of patents
 
Notes: Observations with 0 patents (12993) excluded from the graph
 36
Figure 3. Number of forward citations (conditional on patents > 0) 
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Table 1a. Descriptive statistics 
  
Notes: The statistics shown are means with standard deviations are below. Earnings is real annual work 
income (in 1999 Euros), patents is the number of patents granted, citations is the number of citations 
received, age is the age of the inventor, female is a dummy equal to one if the inventor is female, tenure is 
the number of years with the current employer, and months is the number of months in employment during 
the year, and firm size is the number of employees in the firm in hundreds. 
 
Variable 1991 1995 1997 1998 1999
EARNINGS 37468 41280 46215 52287 79556
16299 18427 36234 44612 260253
PATENTS 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.33 0.42
0.44 0.51 0.54 0.68 0.81
CITATIONS 1.54 2.64 2.50 3.45 3.84
5.86 11.95 8.60 13.19 14.16
AGE 37.7 40.9 42.7 43.5 44.3
7.8 8.2 8.2 8.0 7.9
FEMALE 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
TENURE 8.6 10.4 11.3 11.8 12.3
7.4 8.0 8.3 8.4 8.5
MONTHS  
WORKED/YEAR
11.9 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.7
0.75 0.79 0.68 0.70 1.57
FIRM SIZE (emp/100) 26.4 23.6 28.2 28.5 28.0
22.3 25.3 34.8 35.3 38.8
Observations 1567 1877 1896 1866 1825
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Table 1b. Descriptive statistics conditional on having a patent grant that year 
Variable 1991 1995 1997 1998 1999
EARNINGS 43446 43825 49080 53577 72322
20718 20343 22558 48189 167175
PATENTS 1.22 1.25 1.18 1.28 1.38
0.51 0.62 0.50 0.75 0.91
CITATIONS 12.3 17.4 11.3 13.5 12.5
12.0 26.2 15.3 23.3 23.3
AGE 41.7 41.8 42.4 42.7 42.8
8.3 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.4
FEMALE 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.10
0.24 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.30
TENURE 11.5 11.4 11.7 10.9 11.3
8.0 7.8 7.9 7.8 8.3
MONTHS 12 12 12.0 11.9 11.7
0 0 0.4 0.6 1.5
FIRM SIZE (emp/100) 27.5 25.7 31.8 34.9 34.7
24.3 23.4 36.9 38.9 43.0
Observations 196 284 421 478 560
 
Notes: The statistics shown are means with standard deviations are below. Earnings is real annual work 
income (in 1999 Euros), patents is the number of patents granted, citations is the number of citations 
received, age is the age of the inventor, female is a dummy equal to one if the inventor is female, tenure is 
the number of years with the current employer, and months is the number of months in employment during 
the year, and firm size is the number of employees in the firm in hundreds. 
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Table 1c. Education of inventors 
Levels of education %
Upper secondary 8.54
Lowest level tertiary 9.02
Lower-degree level tertiary 21.8
Higher-degree level tertiary 43.1
Doctorate 13.1
Not known or unspecified 4.46
Fields of education %
General Education 2.04
Humanities and Arts 0.43
Social Sciences and Business 1.34
Natural Sciences 10.7
Engineering 77.9
Agriculture and Forestry 0.81
Health and Welfare 2.09
Services 0.16
Not known or unspecified 4.46
 
 
 
Table 1d. Main industry sectors in the sample 
Class Obs. Percent
Manufacturing:
   Chemicals and chemical products 24 1907 11.9
   Machinery and equipment 29 3741 23.4
   Radio, TV and communication 32 2992 18.7
   Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 1173 7.3
Other business activities (services) 74 1328 8.3
All remaining sectors 4855 30.4
Total 15996 100
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Table 2. Base specification 
 
OLS FE FD
PATENTS 0.0354*** 0.0161** 0.0129**
0.0076 0.0072 0.0061
AGE 0.110*** 0.129***
0.008 0.008
AGE^2  -0.0011***  -0.0011***  -0.0014***
0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
TENURE 0.0068*** 0.0093*** 0.0018
0.0014 0.0013 0.0016
FEMALE -0.213***
0.0228
MONTHS 0.114*** 0.0901*** 0.0870***
0.009 0.007 0.009
FIRM SIZE 0.0008*** 0.0023*** 0.0009**
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Constant 6.724*** 5.853*** 0.166***
0.22 0.219 0.0157
Observations 15996 15996 13419
Individuals 2156 2156 2077
R-squared 0.33 0.23 0.06
Robust standard errors below
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual wage income. All regressions include dummies for the field 
and level of education, dummies for the sector of the firm, dummies for the firm’s regional location, and 
year dummies. OLS are the results from pooled OLS estimations with clustered standard errors, FE are the 
results from using the within (fixed effects) estimator, and FD are the results from the first-differenced 
regressions. 
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Table 3. Including lags 
 
OLS FE FD
PATENTS 0.0494*** 0.0235 0.0275*
0.0126 0.0144 0.0148
PATENTS (t-1) 0.0005 -0.0052 0.0035
0.0167 0.0218 0.0232
PATENTS (t-2) -0.0033 -0.0237 -0.0252
0.0143 0.0225 0.0249
PATENTS (t-3) 0.0050 0.0126 0.0080
0.0206 0.0196 0.0214
PATENTS (t-4) 0.0328** 0.0427** 0.0421*
0.0144 0.0212 0.0218
PATENTS (t-5) 0.0203 0.0552*** 0.0468**
0.0148 0.021 0.0199
PATENTS (t-6) 0.0126 0.0493*** 0.0522**
0.0125 0.0176 0.0206
AGE 0.113*** 0.202***
0.0206 0.0458
AGE^2  -0.0012***  -0.0017***  -0.0016***
0.0002 0.0005 0.0006
TENURE 0.0063*** 0.0079*** 0.0067***
0.0017 0.0022 0.0021
FEMALE -0.225***
0.0348
MONTHS 0.0177*** 0.0067* 0.0044
0.0065 0.0037 0.0045
FIRM SIZE 0.0007 0.0042*** 0.0035***
0.0005 0.0009 0.0010
Constant 7.768*** 4.578*** 0.186***
0.446 1.177 0.057
Observations 4938 4938 3126
Individuals 1789 1789 1639
R-squared 0.23 0.08 0.035
Robust standard errors below
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual wage income. All regressions include dummies for the field 
and level of education, dummies for the sector of the firm, dummies for the firm’s regional location, and 
year dummies. OLS are the results from pooled OLS estimations with clustered standard errors, FE are the 
results from using the within (fixed effects) estimator, and FD are the results from the first-differenced 
regressions. 
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Table 4. With citations 
 
OLS FE FD
PATENTS 0.0398*** 0.0286** 0.0270*
0.0125 0.0136 0.0145
CITS (t-1) 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.00002
0.0012 0.0015 0.0017
CITS (t-2) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0003
0.0008 0.0017 0.0021
CITS (t-3) 0.0025 0.0035* 0.0023
0.0015 0.0018 0.0021
CITS (t-4) 0.0026* 0.0033* 0.0029
0.0014 0.0018 0.0021
CITS (t-5) 0.0014 0.0042** 0.0033*
0.0013 0.0018 0.0019
CITS (t-6) 0.0020 0.0050** 0.0042
0.0020 0.0024 0.0026
AGE 0.111*** 0.179***
0.0207 0.0457
AGE^2  -0.0011***  -0.0015***  -0.0014**
0.0002 0.0005 0.0006
TENURE 0.0062*** 0.0076*** 0.0064***
0.0017 0.0021 0.0021
FEMALE -0.224***
0.0348
MONTHS 0.018*** 0.0052 0.0027
0.0065 0.0044 0.0052
FIRM SIZE 0.0007 0.0043*** 0.0035***
0.0005 0.0009 0.0010
CONSTANT 7.801*** 5.114*** 0.170***
0.4490 1.185 0.0565
Observations 4938 4938 3126
Individuals 1789 1789 1639
R-squared 0.24 0.08 0.04
Robust standard errors below
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual wage income. All regressions include dummies for the field 
and level of education, dummies for the sector of the firm, dummies for the firm’s regional location, and 
year dummies. OLS are the results from pooled OLS estimations with clustered standard errors, FE are the 
results from using the within (fixed effects) estimator, and FD are the results from the first-differenced 
regressions. 
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Table 5. Fixed effects regression with patents classified according to no. of citations 
  
NO CITES 0 < CITES ≤ 10 10 < CITES ≤ 20 20 < CITES ≤ 30 CITES > 30
CURRENT -0.019 -0.039 0.016 0.014 0.097
0.033 0.026 0.052 0.093 0.088
   LAG1 -0.056 -0.027 -0.010 -0.078 0.034
0.045 0.033 0.056 0.131 0.095
   LAG2 -0.127** -0.045 -0.038 -0.131 0.086
0.064 0.039 0.054 0.125 0.135
   LAG3 -0.077 -0.023 0.013 0.001 0.228*
0.054 0.030 0.064 0.129 0.125
   LAG4 -0.101* -0.015 -0.025 0.075 0.315***
0.056 0.031 0.061 0.124 0.118
   LAG5 -0.073 0.038 0.044 0.131 0.327***
0.055 0.028 0.057 0.124 0.112
   LAG6 -0.073 0.019 0.007 0.175** 0.363**
0.053 0.023 0.030 0.078 0.158
Constant 4.800***
1.242
Observations 4938
Individuals 1789
R-squared 0.086
Robust standard errors below
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual wage income. The regressions include all the same control 
variables as before, i.e. age, gender, tenure, months employed, firm size, dummies for the field and level of 
education, dummies for the sector of the firm, dummies for the firm’s regional location, and year dummies.  
 44
 
Table 6. Returns by assignee type 
Variable FE FD
Patents assigned to individuals
PATENTS  -0.076*  -0.075**
0.042 0.038
PATENTS (t-1) -0.127** -0.150***
0.064 0.058
PATENTS (t-2) -0.057 -0.090
0.080 0.083
PATENTS (t-3) 0.109 0.078
0.121 0.103
PATENTS (t-4) 0.039 -0.022
0.103 0.080
PATENTS (t-5) 0.204 0.158*
0.125 0.087
PATENTS (t-6) 0.306** 0.314
0.149 0.201
Patents assigned to firms
PATENTS 0.0251* 0.0285*
0.015 0.015
PATENTS (t-1) -0.003 0.007
0.022 0.023
PATENTS (t-2) -0.023 -0.024
0.023 0.025
PATENTS (t-3) 0.011 0.006
0.020 0.022
PATENTS (t-4) 0.043** 0.043*
0.022 0.022
PATENTS (t-5) 0.051** 0.043**
0.021 0.020
PATENTS (t-6) 0.040** 0.043**
0.016 0.017
AGE 0.204***
0.046
AGE^2  -0.0017***  -0.0016***
0.0005 0.0006
TENURE 0.0082*** 0.0070***
0.002 0.002
MONTHS 0.0064* 0.004
0.004 0.004
FIRM SIZE 0.0042*** 0.0035***
0.0009 0.0010
CONSTANT 4.561*** 0.187***
1.18 0.06
Observations 4938 3126
Individuals 1789 1639
R-squared 0.079 0.04
Robust standard errors below
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log annual wage income. All regressions include dummies for the field 
and level of education, dummies for the sector of the firm, dummies for the firm’s regional location, and 
year dummies. FE are the results from using the within (fixed effects) estimator, and FD are the results 
from the first-differenced regressions. 
